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Adding Salt to the Wound: Affirmative
Action and Critical Race Theory
Carlos J. Nan*
Using quotas instead of quality to select people for jobs and pro-
motions rewards the dumb, lazy, and unambitious at the ex-
pense of the smart, talented, and ambitious.'
I can't turn around without hearing about some 'civil rights ad-
vance!' White people seem to think the black man ought to be
shouting 'hallelujah!' Four hundred years the white man has
had his foot-long knife in the black man's back - and now the
white man starts to wiggle the knife out, maybe six inches! The
black man's supposed to be grateful? Why, if the white man
jerked the knife out, its still going to leave a scar!2
Born in Queens, New York to two immigrant parents, I am
well aware of the difficulties and concerns of inner-city communities
of color. By the time I was nine years old, I was living in California
- raised solely by my mother, an immigrant from the Carribbean.
Despite limited funds and limited opportunities, I have worked very
hard to get where I am today - a working law student with a Bach-
elor's Degree in both Political Science and History.
Ignoring my perseverance and determination, to many I am
merely an "affirmative action baby." After all, affirmative action ex-
plains my success and simultaneously gives the government a pat
on the back for its alleged efforts. Moreover, affirmative action pro-
vides an acceptable explanation for the failures and disappoint-
ments of frustrated, non-minority individuals.
* B.A. in Political Science and History from the University of California, Los
Angeles in 1991. J.D. expected from the University of Minnesota in 1995. The au-
thor wishes to thank professor john a. powell and the editorial staff for their con-
structive criticism and suggestions.
He would also like to acknowledge Professors Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado
for their inspirational scholarship. Special thanks are extended to Mr. Joseph
Walker and Mr. Chester Te for their support, as well as Ms. Jayne Kim for her con-
tributions, insights, and encouragement.
Ultimate thanks goes to the author's mother, Sonia Bido, for her love, support,
understanding, and guidance, without whom he never would have accomplished any
of his endeavors or dreams.
1. Allen C. Ornstein, Quality, Not Quotas, Soc'Y, Jan/Feb. 1976 at 10, 17.
2. MALcoLM X, THE AuroBIoGRAPHY OF MALcoLM X, 273 (1964).
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As cries of reverse discrimination grow louder with each label-
ling of "affirmative action baby," society has become more critical
and skeptical of these remedial policies. This growing skepticism is
necessary, however, to demonstrate the inadequacies of affirmative
action and the burden it places on people of color.
Advocates of the program 3 argue that affirmative action ad-
dresses historic as well as current discrimination. Further, they ar-
gue that affirmative action diversifies homogenous institutions and
places of employment. Another goal of affirmative action policies is
to provide role models for disadvantaged and underrepresented
communities.
Opponents attack these arguments alleging "reverse discrimi-
nation."4 They criticize affirmative action for being psychologically
deleterious to its intended beneficiaries. 5
The actual problems of affirmative action, however, are appro-
priately addressed in a fairly new movement of legal scholarship.
The self-proclaimed Critical Race Theory (CRT),6 has vociferously
criticized affirmative action programs - not on their alleged uncon-
3. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Op-
portunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 362-63 (1988)
(questioning the equality of opportunity ideology underlying Western culture which
'rationalizes heirarchy, justifies disproportionate access to goods and power....
shames those at the bottom into internalizing inadequacy" and allows only limited
use of race-conscious remedies to even out the playing field but not to achieve ra-
cially proportional results); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment
on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (1986) (concluding
that affirmative action should be retained because it essentially combats racial
heirarchy); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1521-24, 1569 (2d ed.
1988) (discussion of affirmative action and "benign" classification in areas of race
and sex).
4. See e.g., Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engi-
neers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1312 (1986) (arguing color-conscious remedies worsen divi-
sions within society, and go against original principals of the civil rights movement
to promote an equal opportunity society); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133-
34 (1974) (arguing that affirmative action divides society, reduces productivity and
promotes inequality); Lino A. Graglia, Special Admissions of the "Culturally De-
prived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351, 352 (1970) (contending that
"[d]iscrimination in favor of some racial or ethnic groups necessarily is or appears to
be discrimination against others."); Martin Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-De-
fined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil
Rights Law, 8 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, 627, 628 (1985) (asserting that Title VII has
been interpreted to mandate discriminating quotas - a perversion of "equal protec-
tion" into "reverse discrimination"); THOMAS SOWELL, CIVL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR RE-
ALITY? 37-38 (1984) (maintaining that "civil rights" has changed from a demand for
equal opportunity regardless of race, religion, or gender to a demand for equality of
results in economic performance and rewards, through preferential or compensatory
treatment because of race, religion, or gender).
5. See, e.g., Carter, The Best Black and Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION 6 (1990).
6. Richard Delgado & Jean Stetancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bib-
liography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993). For purposes of this article, I will refer to
Critical Race Theory as CRT.
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stitutionality or "unfairness," but rather on their slow pace and in-
effectiveness. This article will highlight CRT's contributions to the
debate over affirmative action, and will subsequently examine the
effectiveness of an affirmative action policy from a CRT perspective.
Part I of this article will lay out a legislative history of affirma-
tive action and the Supreme Court's numerous interpretations. In
addition to a historical backdrop, this section will discuss the effec-
tiveness of the program in relation to its intended beneficiaries.
Presumably, implementation of affirmative action programs will re-
sult in a society free of bias and racial imbalance. Statistics prove
otherwise. Part II of the Article will define CRT and discuss the
diverse views held by some of its core members in relation to affirm-
ative action. Part III will analyze affirmative action from a CRT
perspective, as well as provide an alternative outlook to the racial
dilemma by suggesting a culturally nationalistic agenda.
I. Historic Overview of Affirmative Action
A. How It All Began and What It Has Evolved Into
The legal requirement for affirmative-action programs can be
traced back to Title V17 and VII8 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimintation on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, by private as
well as public employers.1 0 Congress, in 1972, passed the Equal
Employment Act of 197211 giving the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) the power to enforce the Civil Rights
Act.12 Under the Act, the EEOC investigates complaints, initiates
legal proceedings where there is substantial evidence of discrimina-
tion, enjoins defendants engaging in unlawful behavior, and orders
appropriate affirmative action programs.13
Shortly after the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
President Lyndon B. Johnson issued executive order No. 11246.14
This order prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, or sex in all organizations receiving federal
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to d-4a (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a (1988).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-1 7 (1988). See also GREGORY SQuIREs, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 6 (1977).
11. See supra note 8.
12. See supra note 8.
13. See supra note 8.
14. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
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contracts of over $10,000. t5 Furthermore, it required affirmative
action plans of all contractors with contracts of $50,000 or more and
employing 50 or more people.16
The specific requirements of affirmative-action plans issued by
executive order No. 11246 are specified by Revised Order No. 4.
The order requires that affirmative action be taken in setting
"goals" and "timetables" for the employment of minority group
members in job categories where they are presently "under-uti-
lized."1 7 In other words, affirmative action means more than mere
passive non-discrimination:
It means that various organizations must act positively, affirm-
atively, and aggressively to remove all barriers, however infor-
mal or subtle, that prevent access by minorities and women to
their rightful places in the employment and educational institu-
tions of the United States.1 8
During the 1960's, whites appeared to agree that the disad-
vantaged deserved more positions and promotions in educational
institutions, as well as the workplace.19 Presumably, this occurred
because opportunities were opening up for everyone. 20 By the late
70's through the 80's, however, job competition had tightened, and
those accustomed to holding privileged positions in the race for good
jobs, pay, and education, grew less inclined to give up their advan-
tage.2 1 Attitude surveys revealed a growing reservation toward af-
firmative action programs.22 In fact, the prevailing attitude of the
15. Id. See also Robert P. Schuwerk, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the
Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1972) (arguing that the Phila-
delphia Plan, an affirmative action plan requiring that federal government contrac-
tors achieve minority employment goals, conflicts with Title VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and therefore is beyond the power of the executive branch).
16. Exec. Order No. 11246, supra note 14.
17. See supra note 14. See also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN
LAW, 645 (2nd ed. 1980) ("The executive order has been uniformly upheld by the
courts. In the leading case, Contractors Ass'n. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor,
the Third Circuit approved goals and timetables in the so called 'Philadelphia Plan,'
developed by the Secretary of Labor under Executive Order 11246. The Philadelphia
Plan required bidders on certain federally assisted projects in the Philadelphia area
to submit with their bids an affirmative action program, including specific goals for
hiring minority group workers in six skilled crafts. No bidder would be awarded a
contract unless his affirmative action goals met standards which had been set at
public hearings"(footnotes omitted)).
18. NiJoLE BENOKRATIS & JOE FEAGIN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITY: ACTION, INACTION, REACTION 1 (1978).
19. CLARISE STASZ, THE AMERICAN NIGHTMARE 37-38 (1981).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Cf. Aric Press & Ann McDaniel, A Right Turn On Race?, NEWSWEEK, June
25, 1984, at 29. See THOMAS EDSALL & MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT
OF RACE, RIGHTS AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 186 (1991) ("In public opinion
polls, whites are opposed to black preferences in hiring and job promotion by a mar-
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majority of the American public was that equality had been
achieved, and more importantly, that the previously disadvantaged
were now gaining on the once privileged.23 Consequently, affirma-
tive action programs became coterminous with "'reverse discrimi-
nation,' a policy that prevented white males from getting their
equal due."24 In other words, policies that offer special advantages
to women and people of color allegedly discriminate against white
men on the basis of their sex and race.26 The Supreme Court took
this very view when it decided Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke.26
In Bakke, a white male applied for admission to the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis and was denied ad-
mission twice. 27 He claimed that the school denied him the right to
admission on a discriminatory basis because the school reserved
16% of its seats for minorities.2 8 The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to decide the issue of whether strict scrutiny of racial classifi-
cations should be relaxed when they are employed for the asserted
purpose of aiding a minority group.
The Court's opinion was indicative of society's perception of
affirmative action. No clear majority opinion emerged from the
case.2 9 Four justices, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
believed the Davis plan was completely constitutional. 30 Four
other justices, Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Chief Justice Bur-
ger, did not decide on a constitutional issue, but rather agreed that
the Davis program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.31 Therefore, Justice Powell's remaining vote formed the
majority.
Justice Powell agreed with the Brennan group that Title VI
proscribes only those racial classifications that violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 3 2 In other words, Justice Powell agreed that the
equal protection clause permits the use of race-conscious criteria in
gin of 81 to 11, and are against reserving openings for blacks at colleges by a margin
of 69 to 22").
23. See supra note 1.
24. STASZ, supra note 19, at 38.
25. Id.
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. Id. at 276-77.
28. Id. at 275, 277-78.
29. Id. at 267.
30. Id. at 355-379.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21.
32. Id. at 287.
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determining admissions to state-supported institutions.3 3 Unlike
the Brennan group, however, Justice Powell contended that a lesser
standard of scrutiny could not be applied.34 Justice Powell stated
that there was no "principaled basis for deciding which groups
would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not."3 5
Justice Powell held that the "guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded
the same protection, then it is not equal."36 Consequently, Justice
Powell applied a strict scrutiny standard which the Davis plan
failed to pass. 3 7 As a result the program was held to be unlawful. 38
Six cases that followed Bakke illustrate the Court's considera-
tion of race-conscious remedies with regards to voluntary imple-
mentation of affirmative-action programs by private employers, set-
asides, lay-offs, hiring, and promotions in places of employment. In
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 39 the Supreme Court con-
fronted the issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers
from implementing voluntary affirmative action programs which
provide preferences to racial minorities. 4 0 In Weber, an affirmative
action plan was negotiated between Kaiser Aluminum and Chemi-
cal Corporation and the steelworkers union, United Steelworkers of
America.4 1 The plan reserved fifty percent of all openings in an on-
the-job training program for African-Americans until the percent-
age of African-American skilled craft workers in the plant roughly
approximated the percentage of African-Americans in the local la-
bor force. 42 The Court did not reach the constitutional issue since
there was no state action.43 Therefore, the Court's only concern
was whether the program violated Title VII. 4 4 A majority of the
Court upheld the plan by rejecting the literal meaning of Title
VII.45
33. Id. at 287-320. Justice Powell also believed that the equal protection clause
permits the use of race-conscious criteria if used to diversify the institution's student
body. Id. at 311-15.
34. Id. at 290-91.
35. Id. at 296.
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
37. Id. at 305-20.
38. Id.
39. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
40. Id. at 197.
41. Id. at 197-98.
42. Id. at 198-99.
43. Id. at 200.
44. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200.
45. Id. at 201-02 (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892) ("a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers")).
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In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 46 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
"Minority Business Enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977 which required that applicants re-
ceiving federal funds for state and local building projects spend at
least 10% of the money for buying goods or services from minority
business enterprises. 4 7 The Court reasoned that Congress had the
right to take measures to remedy the effects of past discrimination
and that these measures need not be colorblind.48 Congress need
only proceed with programs narrowly tailored to achieve its objec-
tives.49 The Court concluded that the set-aside was sufficiently tai-
lored to the valid congressional objective of redressing past
congressional discrimination, and therefore, did not violate equal
protection.SO
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,51 the Court struck
down a collective bargaining agreement which granted African-
American teachers greater protection from lay-offs than white
teachers.5 2 The Court applied a strict scrutiny standard5 3 and
found that the Board of Education had not shown a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest.54 The Court held that an em-
ployer must have a "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary."5 5 In addition, the means chosen
must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that interest. In
this case the Court found that racially influenced lay-offs were not
sufficiently narrowly tailored. 56 Nevertheless, a majority of the
46. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
47. Id. at 454 (citing Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 116, codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. 6705(f)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. II)).
48. Id. at 482. The Court noted that Congress has the broadest remedial powers
of all organs of government which enable it to use the lure of federal funds to induce
voluntary compliance with "federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination
provisions." Id. at 483-84. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971); North Carolina
Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
49. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
50. Id. at 492.
51. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
52. Id. at 272-73. As a result of the layoff provision of the collective bargaining
program, "during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, nonminority teachers
were laid off, while minority teachers with less seniority were retained." Id. at 272.
53. The court asked whether the lay off provision was a narrowly tailored means
of achieving a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 274.
54. Id. at 279-84. The Court rejected the basis upon which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals had upheld the layoff provision: providing minority role models for
minority students to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination. Wygant, 476
U.S. at 274.
55. Id. at 277. "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis
for imposing a racially classified remedy." Id. at 276.
56. Id. at 283-84. The Court found that the Board could have adopted less intru-
sive means such as establishing hiring goals. Id.
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Court agreed that public employers may sometimes voluntarily em-
bark upon a race-conscious scheme to remedy past employment
discrimination.57
In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n v.
EEOC,58 the Court upheld a court-ordered, race-conscious rem-
edy,59 pursuant to Title VII, against a union found guilty of inten-
tionally discriminating in its hiring practices against non-whites.SO
The Supreme Court ruled that courts may order "affirmative race-
conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination"6'1 where there
is "persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to
dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination."6 2
In United States v. Paradise,63 the Court followed its reason-
ing in Sheet Metal Workers,64 upholding a court-ordered, numeri-
cally based hiring goal as a remedy for proven past
discrimination. 6 5 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,66 the
City of Richmond, relying on Fullilove, established a plan requiring
contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at
least thirty percent of their work to minority business enter-
prises.67 The Court, however, reaffirmed the plurality view in Wy-
gant,68 and applied a strict scrutiny standard. The plan failed this
standard because there was insufficient evidence of past discrimi-
nation.6 9 Justice O'Connor's opinion held that:
a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination
in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body
to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to rem-
edy.... While the States and their subdivision may take reme-
dial action when they possess evidence that their own spending
practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination,
57. Id. at 280-82.
58. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
59. In this case, the remedy consisted of the court requiring the union to have
29% minority membership by a certain date, appointing an administrator to super-
vise procedures for recruiting and admitting minorities, and imposing civil contempt
penalties for failure to achieve the percentage goals. Id. at 432-35.
60. Id. at 444-47.
61. Id. at 445.
62. Id.
63. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
64. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
65. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 185-86.
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
67. Id. at 477-80.
68. Id. at 494 (finding "that the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification").
69. Id. at 501-02.
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they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with
some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.70
Taken together, these cases illustrate the Court's desire to
limit affirmative action by requiring any race-conscious program to
be narrowly tailored and to remedy specifically identified patterns
of past discrimination. Accordingly, affirmative action should not
be used to correct broad social discrimination. Although resulting
jurisprudence appears to be a step forward in resolving race
problems in the United States, the cases merely create a compro-
mise which provides some but not enough relief to those who claim
to have been discriminated against. More importantly, these cases
illustrate the Court's attempt to paint a facade of colorblind reason-
ing and interpretation of an allegedly colorblind Constitution.
B. Affirmative Action in Practice: The Myth of the
American Dream
You say things are getting better, but it always turns out that
you mean in relation to the way they were for us. You compare
blacks to blacks, not blacks to whites. If you did the latter,
you'd find little or no progress, so you don't. You don't because
you're caught in a mindset that finds it natural and normal that
whites should be over blacks - that there should be a gap in
educational achievement, health, longevity, and well-being, so
that the only issue is whether things are getting a little better
at the bottom.7 1
Given the perceived improvement in employment, educational
opportunity, public attitudes, and legislation, it would seem logical
that political, economic, and social inequality would have dimin-
ished. There should be an increasing proportion of minorities with
better jobs and higher salaries than several decades ago. In fact,
some signs of improvement should have appeared in all economic
and social measures since the legislation of the 1960's.72 Moreover,
high rates of employment and educational opportunities should be
spread evenly across racial, ethnic, and sex groupings because of
affirmative action programs which require affirmative preference in
hiring and admissions. However, statistical evidence shows
otherwise.73
The actual effects are clear-cut when examining income trends
over the past thirty years. In 1991, for instance, 67.2 million fami-
70. Id. at 498, 504.
71. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We
Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L. J. 923, 932 (1988) (book review).
72. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act.
73. BILL CLINTON, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 380 tbl. B-28 (1993).
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lies of all races earned a median income of $35,939.74 White fami-
lies account for 57.2 million families, earning a median income of
$37,783.75 In other words, white families earned $1,844 over the
median income of all races combined.76 African-American families,
on the other hand, account for 7.7 million families earning a median
income of $21,54877 - a difference of $14,391 compared to the me-
dian income of all races, and $16,235 less than what white families
earned!78
Unfortunately, the disparity between perception and reality
does not end here. The dominant culture assumes, whether liberal
or conservative, that affirmative action has been improving the eco-
nomic well-being of people of color. In fact, some argue that minori-
ties are gaining on the "once-privileged."79 Another look at the
Economic Report of the President, however, clearly demonstrates
otherwise.
Between 1971 and 1991, the median income of African-Ameri-
can families increased by $1,197,80 as opposed to white families
whose median income rose by $4,058.81 Furthermore, the income
gap between races has widened, although the predominant belief is
that people of color are gaining on whites.8 2 In 1971, the difference
between families along racial lines totaled $3,374.83 However, in
1991 the gap had widened by an additional $2,861.84
According to the Economic Report of the President there is no
indication that white families are being economically disadvan-
taged, particularly as a result of the alleged racial advancements of
the 1960's. In light of this data, to claim "reverse discrimination" is
ludicrous. The key to success, as Clarise Stasz argues, "is to pick
the right family to be born into - one whose lineage includes many
of Anglo-Saxon heritage, with a father (and better, mother too) who
has a good job... [However], most of us have already missed out on




77. CLINTON, supra note 73.
78. Id.
79. Ornstein, supra note 1.
80. CLINTON, supra note 73 at 380, tbl. B-28.
81. Id.
82. EDSALL, supra note 22 at 186.
83. CLINTON, supra note 73, at 380, tbl. B-28.
84. Id.
85. STASZ, supra note 19, at 84 (1981).
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II. Critical Race Theory Defined and Its Perspectives on
Affirmative Action
Critical Race Theory, formulated in the mid-1970's,86 officially
began in the summer of 1989 with a workshop held outside
Madison, Wisconsin.8 7 The movement is comprised of scholars,
generally of color, who have realized that the alleged gains of the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's have been ineffective. As a
result, these scholars explore new approaches to the racial
problems faced by this country.8 8 Some of the themes considered by
CRT include, but are not limited to, critiques of liberalism;89 insis-
tence on "naming one's own reality;"90 revisionist interpretations of
American civil rights law;9 1 intersections of race, sex, and class;9 2
cultural nationalism/separatism; 93 and, responses to criticism and
86. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6.
87. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L. J. 1357, 1363 n.18 (1992)
(book review).
88. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6. See also, Richard Delgado, Enormous
Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLuM. L. REv.
1547, 1548 n.5 (1991).
89. Most, if not all, CRT writers are discontent with liberalism as a means
of addressing the American race problem. Sometimes this discontent is
only implicit in an article's structure or focus. At other times, the au-
thor takes as his or her target a mainstay of liberal jurisprudence such
as affirmative action, neutrality, color blindness, role modeling, or the
merit principle ....
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6, at 462.
90. On the way critical race theorists define themselves, Delgado says:
Many Critical Race Theorists consider that a principal obstacle to racial
reform is majoritarian mindset - the bundle of presuppositions, re-
ceived wisdoms, and shared cultural understandings persons in the
dominant group bring to discussions of race. To analyze and challenge
these power-laden beliefs, some writers employ counterstories, para-
bles, chronicles, and anecdotes aimed at revealing their contingency,
cruelty, and self-serving nature.
Id..
91. Delgado states:
One recurring source of concern for Critical scholars is why American
antidiscrimination law has proven so ineffective in redressing racial in-
equality - or why progress has been cyclical, consisting of alternating
periods of advance followed by ones of retrenchment. Some Critical
scholars address this question, seeking answers in the psychology of
race, white self-interest, the politics of colonialism and anticolonialism,
or other sources.
Id.
92. Id. at 463 ("Other scholars explore the intersections of race, sex, and class,
pursuing such questions as whether race and class are separate disadvantaging fac-
tors, or the extent to which Black women's interest is or is not adequately repre-
sented in the contemporary women's movement.").
93. Id. ("An emerging strain within CRT holds that people of color can best pro-
mote their interest through separation from the American mainstream. Some be-
lieve that preserving diversity and separateness will benefit all, not just groups of
color. We include here, as well, articles encouraging black nationalism, power, or
insurrection.").
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self-criticism. 94 The core scholars who have written on these
themes include Derrick Bell, Kimberle Crenshaw, Richard Delgado,
Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams. 9 5
Importantly, not all CRT scholars adhere to a particular phi-
losophy of thought. "CRT lacks a formal structure ... "96 For in-
stance, some scholars support affirmative action programs, but are
critical of either their effectiveness or focus their writing toward
challenging its opponents. 97 On the other hand, a few scholars are
skeptical and suspicious of the program and its intended purpose.98
According to Patricia Williams, an advocate of affirmative ac-
tion policies, affirmative action "is an act of verification and of vi-
sion. It is an act of social as well as professional responsibility."9 9
Robin Barnes, a CRT proponent who also strongly advocates for af-
firmative action, believes it benefits a broad class of minority citi-
zens. In her view, the benefits of affirmative action include "a
measure of reparation (albeit small) for past injustice, greater eco-
nomic efficiency by providing poor, working poor, middle class, and
upper middle class Blacks educational, employment, and business
opportunities, and improved opportunities for integration and di-
versity."'OO In fact, Barnes believes that women, people of color,
and the disabled "are entitled to the preferences not only to remedy
past discrimination and abate the effects of today's exclusionary
practices, but also to stem the tide of perpetual domination that has
been the prerogative of the 'normal' white male for all too long."10 1
In contrast, CRT skeptics of affirmative action question the
program's effectiveness. For Derrick Bell, affirmative action is "the
latest contrivance the society has created to give blacks the sense of
equality while withholding its substance."'102 In fact, Bell suggests
that affirmative action policies are intended to benefit African-
94. Id. ("Under this heading we include works of significant criticism addressed
at CRT, either by outsiders or persons within the movement, together with re-
sponses to such criticism.").
95. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6.
96. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 6, at 463.
97. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 121 (1991);
Robin Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison, 101 YALE L.
J. 1631 (1992).
98. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 140-61 (1987) [hereinafter
WE ARE NOT SAVED]; Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595 (1989)[hereinafter Xerces]; Richard Delgado, Affirmative
Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991).
99. WILLAMS, supra note 97, at 50.
100. Barnes, supra note 97, at 1647.
101. Id. at 1649.
102. Xerces, supra note 98, at 1598.
[Vol. 12:553
1994]AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & CRITICAL RACE THEORY565
Americans only to the extent that their gains do not threaten or
impinge on the status of whites.103 Bell writes:
Those who wield effective control in the nation make, when con-
sidered necessary, that amount of social adjustments that will
help to siphon off sufficient discontent to enable the societal sta-
tus quo to be maintained .... [Tioken or cosmetic gains are
extended under the formal Constitution, while, under the oper-
ational code, of the unwritten basic law, no real redistribution
of wealth, prestige, or social power takes place.104
In addition, Richard Delgado contends that affirmative action
programs were "designed by others to promote their purposes, not
ours."10 5 In his view, "affirmative action serves as a homeostatic
device, assuring that only a small number of women and people of
color are hired and promoted."1 0 6
Bell and Delgado's skepticism of remedial policies allegedly in-
tended to benefit the disadvantaged are the most controversial in
CRT scholarship. The dominant culture assumes that people of
color should be grateful, or at least optimistic about the progress
the United States has made in its alleged attempt to ameliorate its
racial problem. The writings of Bell and Delgado reflect a distrust
in the purportedly democratic system of the United States. This
perspective is nothing new to the political and social scientist or
historian.1O7 However, such writings and concepts are a novelty to
legal scholarship. For this reason, my analysis of CRT and its per-
spective on affirmative action will focus upon the legal scholarship
of Professors Bell and Delgado.
III. Affirmative Action Analyzed
The 1993 Economic Report of the PresidentO8 provides evi-
dence that affirmative action programs have been, for the most
part, ineffective.0 9 Moreover, the report illustrates that argu-
ments of "reverse discrimination" are undoubtedly futile.11o In
fact, claims of reverse discrimination would be valid:
only if preferential affirmative action required the "niggeriza-
tion" of white males - to use with apologies that cruel term that
103. See WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 98, at 140-61.
104. Arthur Miller, Pretense and Our 7vo Constitutions, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
375, 375 (1986), quoted in Xerces, supra note 98, at 1599.
105. Delgado, supra note 98, at 1226.
106. Id. at 1224.
107. ROBERT ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1990); FRAN72
FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1965); MALcoLM X, MALCoLM X SPEAKS
(George Breitman ed. 1965).
108. CLINTON, supra note 73.
109. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
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connotes the spirit and effects of the caste system. But in what
sense are we planning to systematically insult white males and
put them in the lowest caste in society? In what sense does
preferential affirmative action plan to decrease the life span of
white males and their wives and children? Is this policy geared
to making white males hate themselves and be ashamed of
their physical appearance? Will it make white male unemploy-
ment double that of blacks and will it reduce white male salary
to 60% of that of blacks? Will it confine white males to ghettos
where there are more rats than people and no hope? To truly
reverse the discriminatory process would require all of that.
Obviously, none of that is contemplated or possible. The term
.reverse discrimination" houses a big lie.11 1
Furthermore, white males have benefited from their own af-
firmative action for over 200 years. 112 "[C]ritics neatly take our
eyes off the system of arrangements that brought and maintained
them in power, and enabled them to develop the rules and stan-
dards of quality and merit that now exclude us, make us appear
unworthy, dependent (naturally) on affirmative action." 113
The standards of merit set by white males are also questiona-
ble. The usual excuse given by employers or academic administra-
tors is that there are not enough "qualified" minorities carrying the
requisite merits to capably handle the duties of the vacant position.
Bell notes, however, that such assertions are incredulous or dis-
criminatory at best as these employers and administrators:
know that the qualifications they insist on are precisely the cre-
dentials and skills that have been long denied to people of color.
Those credentials, moreover, are often irrelevant or of little im-
portance and therefore serve mainly as barriers to most minori-
ties and a great many whites as well. 114
In fact, Delgado argues, "[m]erit sounds like white people's affirma-
tive action.... A way of keeping their own deficiencies neatly hid-
den while assuring that only people like them get in."115
CRT, however, acknowledges that there are advantages to be-
ing a racial or ethnic minority.1 16 For example, the values of
"double consciousness," termed by W.E.B. DuBois,117 provide peo-
ple of color with the ability to see society in terms of two perspec-
tives. One perspective is the world as seen from the eyes of the
111. DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, A NEW AMERICAN JUSTICE: ENDING THE WHITE MALE
MONOPOLIES 169, 170 (1981).
112. Delgado, supra note 98, at 1225.
113. Id.
114. Xerces, supra note 98, at 1605.
115. Delgado, supra note 81, at 1364.
116. See Id. at 1365-67; Barnes, supra note 97, at 1652-58.
117. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS 16-17 (1903), cited in Delgado,
supra note 87, at 1366 n.37.
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oppressor in which people of color are exploited and dehuman-
ized."18 The other perspective is seen from the eyes of the op-
pressed in which their own values and cultures are revered.119 In
other words, minority status is viewed as an affirmative qualifica-
tion.120 For exmple, "[a] black professor who can alleviate the ra-
cism of his white students and inspire learning and hope in his
black students is a better teacher for that."121
Nevertheless, Delgado claims that even if "double conscious-
ness" is ever recognized as a valuable asset, whites will deny it ex-
ists, or insist they have it as well. 122
Delgado also questions the diversity argument for affirmative
action:
In law school admissions, for example, majority persons may be
admitted as a matter of right, while minorities are admitted be-
cause their presence will contribute to "diversity." . . . The as-
sumption is that such diversity is educationally valuable to the
majority. But such an admissions program may well be per-
ceived as treating the minority admittee as an ornament, a cu-
riosity, one who brings an element of the piquant to the lives of
white professors and students. 12 3
Delgaldo, moreover, attacks the role model argument for af-
firmative action. 124 Being a role model requires that you "uplift
your entire people";12 5 complete the duties required in the job de-
scription, as well as assist your community whenever it affects your
position or that of your employer; conform into behavior that will
encourage the community of color to adopt majoritarian social mo-
res; and lie to your community about how they too can achieve the
"American Dream" because the arms of opportunity are open and
waiting to welcome them.126 The program, instituted, arranged,
and produced by "others"12 7 appears to work against people of color
much like cream to coffee. "[Ihf you pour too much cream in it, you
won't even know you ever had coffee. It used to be hot, it becomes
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Rem-.
edies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 7 (1979).
121. MAGuiRm, supra note 111, at 173.
122. Delgado, supra note 87, at 1367. See also Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques
of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
123. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 570 n.46 (1984).
124. Delgado, supra note 98, at 1226-31.
125. Id. at 1226-27.
126. Id. at 1227-28.
127. Id. at 1226.
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cool. It used to be strong, it becomes weak. It used to wake you up,
now it puts you to sleep." 128
So where does that leave people of color? All this cynicism
about a program which was allegedly intended to benefit the least
advantaged and about how it has actually patronized communities
of color, has destroyed any hope of amelioration of the country's ra-
cial problem. Where do people of color go from here? The first step,
according to CRT, is to expect nothing but the worst from the domi-
nant culture. 129 History provides enough evidence of what white
people have accomplished, not only for themselves, but for society
in general.130 In addition, assuming arguendo that the dominant
culture has an interest in ending the racial dilemma and healing
the wounds they have inflicted upon communities of color, that in-
terest will be limited such that programs implemented to assist
people of color do not infringe on whites' property interest or sta-
tus.'13 Furthermore, attempts by the dominant culture to ease the
racial dilemma should be critically scrutinized as only a vehicle to
calm racial tensions and prevent civil disorders, rather than as a
reparation for the destruction and mayhem inflicted upon commu-
nities of color. 132 The statistics provided in this article, illustrating
the dramatic "advancements" reached by affirmative action and
civil rights legislation,' 33 should provide sufficient evidence to per-
suade a person of color to look at the dominant culture and their
alleged interests in alleviating the racial crisis with a suspicious
eye.
The second step CRT advances is to "take our own program,
with our own goals, our own theoretical grounding, and our own
managers and call it 'Affirmative Action.' "134 In other words, peo-
ple of color should pursue a culturally nationalist objective.
128. MALCOuM X, supra note 107, at 16.
129. Delgado, supra note 98.
130. Delgado, supra note 87, at 1371-73.
131. Xerces, supra note 98, at 1602 ("It is a paradox, but while your people's strug-
gle in the courts for racial justice has given substance to some basic rights, the Con-
stitution remains a document that secures vested property interests rather than
personal freedoms for either blacks or whites. To the extent that your affirmative
action policies threaten property interests of identifiable whites, they will not be up-
held."). See also WE ARE NoT SAVED, supra note 98, at 140-61.
132. Healing the scar, as opposed to only "jerk[ing] the knife out." See supra note
2 and accompanying text. See also Xerces, supra note 98, at 1604 ("The... Court's
liberal precedents actually protected the economic and political status quo by re-
sponding to the pleas for justice by blacks and other severely disadvantaged groups
just enough to siphon off discontent, thereby limiting the chances that the existing
social order would pay more than minimal costs for the reforms achieved.").
133. See supra text accompanying notes 73-84.
134. Delgado, supra note 98, at 1226.
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It is necessary for us to develop a new frame of reference which
transcends the limits of white concepts. It is necessary for us to
develop and maintain a total intellectual offensive against the
false universality of white concepts .... By and large, reality
has been conceptualized in terms of narrow point of view of the
small minority of white men who live in Europe and North
America. We must abandon the partial frame of reference of
our oppressors and create new concepts which will release our
reality, which is also the reality of the overwhelming majority
of men and women on this globe. We must say to the white
world that there are things in the world that are not dreamt of
in your history and your sociology and your philosophy. 13 5
The bottom line being, that only people of color can comprehend the
history, experiences, and dilemmas faced by their community.
Therefore, people of color are in a better position to theorize, evalu-
ate, access, confront, tackle, and resolve the problems encountered
within their community.
In order to reach this intellectual level, whites, and in particu-
lar people of color, must accept the reality that this country, along
with its Constitution, statutes, court-made laws, politics, economy,
and social mores and attitudes, is not color-blind, but rather race-
conscious. Malcolm X appropriately stated:
Being here in America doesn't make you an American. Being
born here in America doesn't make you an American. Why, if
birth made you American, you wouldn't need any legislation,
you wouldn't need any amendments to the Constitution, you
wouldn't be faced with civil rights filibustering in Washington,
D.C., right now. They don't have to pass civil-rights legislation
to make a Polack an American. 136
The problem white society, and in particular white liberals,
have in grasping this concept is twofold. Gary Peller, a white law
professor who has contributed to CRT scholarship explains:
Within the white community, the conflict over race tradition-
ally has been structured around an opposition between white
supremacists who supported segregation, and white liberals
and progressives committed to integration and civil rights re-
form. To white liberals and progressives, looking through the
prism of integrationist ideology, a nationalist conception of ra-
cial identity was understood to distinguish backward, ignorant
whites from cosmopolitan, educated whites. Whites who took
race as central to their self-identity thereby expressed a com-
mitment to racial supremacy, whereas whites who opposed ra-
cism understood that opposition to require the transcendence of
racial identity in favor of integration and color-blindness. In
other words, most white liberals and progressives, projecting
themselves as the enlightened avant garde of the white commu-
135. LERONE BENNETr, THE CHALLENGE OF BLACKNEss 35-36 (1972).
136. MALcoLM X, supra note 107, at 26.
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nity, automatically associated race nationalism with the repres-
sive history of white supremacy, and never developed either a
consciousness or a political practice that comprehended racial
identity and power as centrally formative factors in American
social relations. 137
Therefore, since race-consciousness or cultural nationalism, as
perceived by the white community, is an ideology equated with
white supremacy, the solution must be neutrality and color-blind-
ness through an integrationist ideology.138 Consequently, affirma-
tive action policies are problematic for whites because they create a
tension between their convictions of tolerance and color-blindness
as represented through their perceived universal and neutral stan-
dards of merit, and the use of race-conscious programs as a means
to remedy past discrimination. "Affirmative action has been char-
acterized as merely an exceptional remedy for past injustice, rather
than an affirmative right rooted in present social circumstances. It
has been characterized as temporary and only necessary to achieve
integration, at which time equal opportunity can take over."13 9 In
fact, "conservatives utilize the very rhetoric of tolerance, color-
blindness, and equal opportunity that once characterized progres-
sive discourse to mark the limits of reform."140
Peller, however, explains:
[I]ntegrationists, organizing their perception of racial justice
around images of objectivity, rationality, and neutrality, never
considered whether this language for distinguishing the worthy
from the unworthy itself might serve to help justify racial domi-
nation - if not to its victims, then at least to white beneficiaries
who need to believe that their social positions are the result of
something more than the brute fact of social power and racial
domination.141
Whites fail to comprehend that their utopian solution of a color-
blind society through their form of integration "actually increases
137. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L. J. 758, 761 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 770-71. According to Peller, the integrationist ideology holds that the
cure for discrimination is equal treatment according to neutral norms. And at the
institutional level, integrationism obviously means an end to the social system of
racial segregation. In sum, the cure for racism would be equal treatment on an indi-
vidual level and integration on an institutional level. In any event, integrationists
believed the two would go hand in hand. Once neutrality replaced discrimination,
equal opportunity would lead to integrated institutions; experience in integrated in-
stitutions would, in turn, replace the ignorance of racism with the knowledge that
actual contact provides .... Integrationists are committed to the view that race
makes no real difference between people, except as unfortunate historical vestiges of
irrational discrimination. In an extreme form of the integrationist picture, the hope
is that when contact occurs between different groups in society, not only race, but all
"ethnic identity will become a thing of the past." Id. (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 776.
140. Id. at 762.
141. Id. at 778.
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the white community's control over the black one by destroying in-
stitutions, and by absorbing black leadership and coinciding its in-
terests with those of the white community .. ".."142
Race consciousness is a problem within the white community,
particularly the liberal community, because, in their eyes, it creates
a false sense of superiority which in turn results in the subjugation
of people of color. Historically, white race consciousness forces peo-
ple of color to feel inferior. The civil rights movement, however,
made some whites realize that their position was not the result of
racial superiority but rather brute force. Nonetheless, whites were
not willing to give up their undeserved status. All they were willing
to do is drop the notion of conscious racial superiority and relieve
themselves of guilt through limited integration, thereby compelling
people of color to assimilate into white culture.
Race consciousness for people of color, on the other hand, does
not imply the annihilation of the white populace or the superiority
of communities of color over caucasians, as it does for whites.
Rather, it is a "commitment to the vitality of the [community of
color] as a whole and to the economic and cultural health of [each
respective community's] neighborhoods, schools, economic enter-
prises, and individuals."143
Conclusion
Affirmative action programs have proven effective to a limited
degree, but they have also proven quite burdensome for communi-
ties of color. As implemented, affirmative action has been wrongly
utilized as a tool by the dominant culture to rid itself of guilt and
responsibility for its inhumane and criminal actions. The program
has created a facade of equal opportunity in the face of worsening
racial conditions and disparities. 144 This facade simultaneously de-
nies communities of color autonomy and self-determination.
The solution lies in re-evaluating affirmative action programs
and their ramifications. People of color should note that affirmative
action programs have not been used or implemented in their best
interest. Further, reliance on a program created and structured by
the same power structure which is the cause of the problem is illogi-
cal. Communities of color should create their own programs to ade-
quately further their interests. And if affirmative action policies
142. Id. at 783 (quoting Robert S. Browne, A Case for Separatism, in SEPARATION
OR INTEGRATION: WHICH WAY FOR AMERICA: A DIALOGUE 7-15 (R. Browne & B. Rus-
tin eds. 1968)).
143. Id. at 845.
144. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
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are to continue, they should not be perceived or implemented to
remedy past discrimination, for purposes of diversity, or to create
role models. Affirmative action should be implemented as an af-
firmative right, justly deserved by people of color for their struggle
in overcoming the racism, oppression, and exploitation they have
encountered, while simultaneously contributing to this country's
wealth and status. In addition, affirmative action programs should
be perceived as reparations for past and current exclusion from the
benefits reaped by those who did nothing, but received everything.
Well I am one who doesn't believe in deluding myself. I'm not
going to sit at your table and watch you eat, with nothing on my
plate, and call myself a diner. Sitting at the table doesn't make
you a diner, unless you eat some of what's on that plate. 14 5
145. MALcoLM X, supra note 107, at 26.
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